AMENDMENTS TO THE CLAIMS

Claims 1-3 (Cancelled)

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(Currently Amended) A method comprising:
 identifying a first and a second radio protocol;

receiving the <u>first and second</u> radio <u>protocols</u> protocol;

prior to downloading the <u>first and second</u> radio <u>protocols to a baseband</u>

<u>moduleprotocol by a vendor</u>, determining whether the <u>first and second</u>

radio <u>protocols meet protocol meets</u> certification requirements of a thirdparty certification authority <u>prior to the radio protocol being distributed to</u>

the vendor;

providing guarantees regarding the certification requirements to a relevant authority; and

- if the first and second radio protocols meet the certification requirements,

 downloading the first and second radio protocols to protocol at a nonvolatile memory device at a coupled to the baseband module, wherein the

 baseband module is to operate under both the first and second radio

 protocols if the radio protocol meets the certification requirements.
- 5. (Currently Amended) The method of claim 4, wherein the determining of the radio protocol first and second radio protocols meeting the certification requirements comprises authenticating the radio protocol first and second radio protocols using a first cryptographic key stored at the baseband module.
- 6. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 5, wherein the first cryptographic key comprises a public key.

7. (Currently Amended) The method of claim 1, wherein the downloading of the radio protocol first and second radio protocols comprises writing the radio protocol first and second radio protocols to the non-volatile memory device via a boot loader program.

8. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 7, further comprising determining whether the boot loader program is approved by a manufacturer of the baseband module.

9. (Previously Presented) The method of claim 8, wherein the determining whether the boot loader program is approved by the manufacturer comprises authenticating the program using a second cryptographic key stored at the baseband module.

 (Previously Presented) The method of claim 9, wherein the second cryptographic key comprises a public key.

Claims 11-15 (Cancelled)

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16. (Currently Amended) A system comprising:a receiver to receive and identify a <u>first and a second</u> radio protocol;a mechanism to:

moduleprotocol by a vendor, determine whether the first and second radio protocols meetprotocol meets certification requirements of a third-party certification authority-prior to the radio protocol being distributed to the vendor, and provide guarantees regarding the certification requirements to a relevant authority; and

- a non-volatile memory device at a coupled to the baseband module to accept a download of and store the first and second radio protocols protocol and store the radio protocol, if the first and second radio protocols meet the certification requirements, wherein the baseband module is to operate under both the first and second radio protocols protoco.
- 17. (Currently Amended) The system of claim 16, wherein the mechanism is further to authenticate the radio protocol first and second radio protocols using a first cryptographic key stored at the baseband module.
- 18. (Previously Presented) The system of claim 17, wherein the first cryptographic key comprises a public key.
- 19. (Currently Amended) The system of claim 16, wherein the radio protocol is first and second radio protocols are downloaded at the non-volatile memory device via a boot loader program.
- 20. (Previously Presented) The system of claim 19, wherein the mechanism is further to determine whether the boot loader program is approved by a manufacturer of the baseband module.
- 21. (Previously Presented) The system of claim 20, wherein the mechanism is further authenticate the boot loader program using a second cryptographic key stored at the baseband module.
- 22. (Previously Presented) The system of claim 21, wherein the second cryptographic key comprises a public key.
- 23. (Currently Amended) A machine-readable medium having stored thereon sets of instructions which, when executed by a machine, cause the machine to: identify a <u>first and a second radio protocol</u>;

receive the first and second radio protocols protocol;

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prior to downloading the <u>first and second</u> radio <u>protocols to a baseband</u>

<u>moduleprotocol by a vendor</u>, determine whether the <u>first and second</u> radio

<u>protocols meet protocol meets</u> certification requirements of a third-party

certification authority <u>prior to the radio protocol being distributed to the</u>

<u>vendor</u>;

provide guarantees regarding the certification requirements to a relevant authority; and

if the first and second radio protocols meet the certification requirements,

download the first and second radio protocols to protocol at a non-volatile

memory device at a coupled to the baseband module, wherein the

baseband module is to operate under both the first and second radio

protocols if the radio protocol meets the certification requirements.

- 24. (Currently Amended) The machine-readable medium of claim 23, wherein the determining of the radio protocol first and second radio protocols meeting the certification requirements comprises authenticating the radio protocol first and second radio protocols using a first cryptographic key stored at the baseband module.
- 25. (Previously Presented) The machine-readable medium of claim 24, wherein the first cryptographic key comprises a public key.
- 26. (Currently Amended) The machine-readable medium of claim 23, wherein the downloading of the writing the radio protocol first and second radio protocols to the non-volatile memory device.

27. (Previously Presented) The machine-readable medium of claim 26, wherein the sets of instructions when executed further cause the machine to determine whether the boot loader program is approved by the manufacturer of the baseband module.

28. (Previously Presented) The machine-readable medium of claim 27, wherein the sets of instructions when executed further cause the machine to authenticate the boot loader program via a second cryptographic key stored at the baseband module.

29. (Previously Presented) The machine-readable medium of claim28, wherein the second cryptographic key comprises a public key.

Claims 30-36 (Cancelled)

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